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Cor~orat ions- Contracts between Compjanies having same Directors
-Bonds- Purchase by controlling Directors at Discount.- Coe v. East
& W. R. Co. of Alabama, and Grant v. Same, 52 Fed. Rep.
531 (Ala.) This is another case that may help to establish the
line between valid and void contracts between corporations having
the same directors. The facts are as follows: A railroad com-
pany leased a line belonging to an iron company, the considera-
tion being the issue to it by the railroad company of certain stocks
and bonds. The stockholders of the latter unanimously ratified
the contract. The directors of the railroad company were at the
same time directors and stockholders in the iron company. On a
bill in equity to foreclose the whole mortgage of the railroad, the
holders of certain of the bonds filed an auxiliary bill, praying that
the bonds issued to the iron company be declared void in such
foreclosure. The question was, How far is a contract between an
agent acting for his principal and a third party valid, when the
agent and the third party are really the same person? The court
seems to have entertained no doubt as to its validity in this case:
"As a whole I find that the transaction was valid, the parties
were able to contract, and did contract. There appears to have
been no fraud or deceit between the consenting parties, nor any
intentional overvaluation, and the consideration was as nearly
adequate as could be expected under such circumstances. * 
* *
I conclude therefore that the transactions are unimpeachable on
the part of the complainants." The apparent conflict between this
ruling and the principle laid down in Morawetz (Priv. Corp., Sec-
tion 528) seems to have been explained by the fact that the action
complained of was subsequently ratified by the stockholders. The
opinion is supported by a number of cases. Another point worthy
of mention regards the purchase by the directors of the company's
bonds at a discount. By forbearing to collect interest on bonds
and by advances they had become the company's creditors to a
large amount, which the stockholders authorized to be paid by the
issue of new bonds. The directors had previously resolved that
such bonds should not be disposed of at less than sixty-five per
cent of their par value, which was the rate at which they then
took them in satisfaction of their claims. This transaction was
also upheld.
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Descripton in Deed-'" Contiguous Land"- Parol Evidence- Hols-
ton Salt and Plaster Co. v. Campbell et al., 16 S. E. Rep. 274 (Va.)
P, wishing to convey to G, in trust for the payment of his debts,
all of his real estate, which consisted of a tract of land originally
known as the "Preston Salt Works," covering three hundred
acres, a number of other tracts touching it, and the piece in ques-
tion situated three-quarters of a mile distant from the rest, but all
used for the same purpose, executed a deed of "that tract or par-
cel of land lying in Smyth County, on the waters of the north
fork of the Holston, commonly known as the ' Preston Salt Works
Estate,' and containing six thousand nine hundred and ninety-
five acres" (evidently meaning the whole 'property). G subse-
quently sold the salt works property to S, describing it as "being
all the estate, right, title and interest which P conveyed to the
said G by deed bearing date July 7, 1859, in the Preston Salt
Works Estate, and the lands contiguous thereto "(meaning hereby
the "Preston Salt Works Estate" only the original piece of three
hundred acres). G's successor as trustee now sues in ejectment
for the tract lying apart from the main body. The question then
is, was this piece "contiguous" to the rest, so as to pass by the
second deed? Although "contiguous" does not necessarily mean
touching, as in the case of a building (Arhell v. Commerce Ins. Co.,
69 N. Y. 193), still this is its primary meaning, and it must be so
construed in the absence of any words in the context modifying
its signification. It seems to have been the intention of both the
grantor and grantee in the second deed that the tract should pass.
While equity might relieve in the case of mutual mistake to
reform the deed, still a court of law cannot alter a deed, and
parol evidence and records to prove the intentions of the parties
are inadmissible. Judgment of the lower court for the plaintiff is
therefore affirmed.
Park- What Constitutes Dedication.- Steel v. City of Portland, 31
Pac. Rep. 479 (Ore.). Lots were sold from a plat made at one
Holladay's request by order of his trustee, in the centre of which
was a solid tract of land marked "Park." This latter was
enclosed by him and kept in order until 1883 or 1884, when the city
of East Portland by its officers and agents took possession of it, and
the city of Portland, successor in interest to the city of East Port-
land had since that time continuously cared for and improved it as
apublic park. The plaintiff, Steel, Holladay's successor in interest,
brought this action to recover the park on the ground that the
original owner of the land intended it as a private park and did not
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dedicate it to public use. The court held that the owner by sell-
ing lots from the above-mentioned plat, and in reference to it,
had dedicated the park to the public, and that plaintiff could not
set up a different intent.
Breach of Contract- Pleading-Nominal Damages.- Acheson v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 31 Pac. Rep. 583 (Cal.). Defendant
undertook to transmit a telegram for plaintiff, and made a mis-
take, for which this action for damages was brought. Defendant
demurred, but the demurrer was overruled and judgment given
for plaintiff for want of answer. The court held that the
demurrer should have been sustained, for no consideration was
alleged for defendant's undertaking to transmit the message, and
the contract was not accepted by common law or by statute, for it
was neither under seal nor in writing, and reversed the judgment
for the full amount of damages prayed for, on the ground that
special damage was not shown and nominal damages only were
recoverable on the complaint.
Elections - Ballots.-Miller v. Pennoyer et al., 3' Pac. Rep. 830
(Ore.). One of the People's party candidates for elector was sub-
sequently nominated by the Democratic party and his name was
printed in both groups of electors. The Oregon statute, commonly
called the "Australian Ballot Law," provides that "the name of
each person nominated shall be printed in but one place." It makes
it the duty of the county clerks to "cause to be printed all ballots
to be used or voted" under the act. A writ of mandamus was
applied for to restrain the Secretary of State from counting the
ballots on which this name appeared twice. The court held, that
the printing of the name twice was contrary to the provisions of
the act, but that, since the statute did not declare such ballots to
be void, it did not vitiate the ballots; that a technical mistake of
a county clerk should not defeat a voter's right to exercise his
elective franchise. "Such a construction of the law would not
only render an election invalid on account of an honest mistake of
a county clerk but would open the door to the gravest fraud. It
would place the pQwer in the hands of a dishonest officer to dis-
enfranchise the voters of his county as well as to cause the defeat
of any particular candidate. To defeat the will of the people or a
particular candidate it would only be necessary to furnish the
electors or a part of them with ballots slightly variant or differing
from those prescribed by law. Unless the law is clearly manda-
tory or in some way declares the consequences of a departure
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from its provisions the court ought not to defeat the will of the
people when fairly expressed because of some technical error or,
mistake in the form of the ballot."
Mutual Benefit Insurance - Rights of Beneficiaries -Joint Ten-
ancy.-Ffarr et al. v. Trustees of Grand Lodge of the A. 0. U. W. of
State of Wisdonsin et al. 53 N. W. Rep. 738. Peck, the father of
plaintiff, had his life insured with the defendants for two thou-
sand dollars, payable to the plaintiff and her mother,-they being
the daughter and wife respectively of Peck, who survived the
wife by ten years. When he died the plaintiff made formal
demand for the payment of the policy for two thousand dollars.
Defendants paid one thousand dollars and claimed that the other
thousand dollars reverted back to the estate because of the death
of the mother, under the laws of the State, which provided that
"all grants and devises of lands made to two or more persons
shall be construed to create estates in common and not in joint
tenancy, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy," also
that "the preceding section shall not apply to mortgages, nor to
devises, or grants made in trust, or made to executors, or to hus-
band and wife." The question was whether the policy was pay-
able to the mother and daughter severally, or as an entirety, as
tenants in common, or as joint tenants. The court held that
because of the close analogy to property held in joint tenancy the
policy was payable as an entirety. And so we conclude that this
insurance in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship is within
the exception of our own statute in analogy to devises, and that
the doctrine of the common law governs it.
.Disgualification of Judge.- In Heinlen v. Hedibron, 31 Pac. Rep.
838 (Cal.), it was claimed that while the suit was pending, the
judge bought lands which formed a part of the same original tract
to which the land in suit belonged, but no evidence was offered
to show that the title to the judge's land in any way depended on
the result of the suit. The court held that while it is necessary
that a judge shall always be wholly disinterested, yet he has no
right to refuse to act except when he is positively disqualified.
The fact that a judge has acted is conclusive that in his own opin-
ion he is competent to do so and the presumption of integrity
which attaches to any act performed under his oath is too strong
to be overcome by mere inference, and that these facts could not
sustain a charge of interest.
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Resulting Trust- When Arises-Parol Evidence- Statute of
Frauds-Imbrovements as Consideration.- Seiler v. Mohn, i6 S. E.
Rep. 496 (W. Va.). One of the ordinary cases of resulting trusts
is where one party takes the title, while another pays the consid-
eration. The Supreme Court of West Virginia has somewhat
extended the doctrine in this case. S made a written agreement
with K, the owner of a certain tract of land, for its transfer to S,
credit to be given him for a certain time for the purchase money.
S thereupon took possession, and built a house and made other
valuable improvements on it, but soon found himself unable to
pay the price of the land. He therefore made a verbal agree-
ment with M and R, who were to pay for the land, get a deed,
and each have a one-third interest in it,-S to receive his third in
consideration of the improvements he had made. M and R in
fact agreed with K upon the price to be paid by them. But sub-
sequently, without the knowledge of S, they bought the land and
took a deed of the whole interest to themselves, disregarding any
claim that S might have on the property. S therefore brought
suit to have M and R declared trustees for him for his undivided
third interest. Although he had paid no part of the real purchase
money, and although his contract with M and R was merely ver-
bal, still a parol contract was considered sufficient to support a
trust implied by law, and his improvements on the land were held
equivalent to the payment of a consideration. Furthermore, M
and R's dealings were held to be in pursuance of their agreement
with S. A decree declaring the trust for S was therefore
granted.
Impeachment of Verdict.-Chicago &- L. Coal Co. v. h cDaniels, 32
N. E. Rep. 728 (Ind.). In this case the misconduct of the jury is
assigned as one of the reasons why a new trial should be granted.
An affidavit was presented showing that the verdict was
arrived at in this manner: That the jurors agreed that a vote
should be taken and the different amounts voted by the jurors
should be added together and the sum divided by twelve; that
this quotient should be the amount of damages assessed against
the defendant, and that this quotient was adopted as the damages.
Counsel objected to the method of proof of the facts set forth in
the affidavit, and asserted that the presumptions were that the
verdict was arrived at in a lawful manner; and since no one has a
right to be in the jury-room during the deliberations of the jury,
the one making the affidavit must disclose how he gained his
information before the court will receive and consider it. The
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court held that the affidavit stated as a fact that the quotient
method was used in assessing the damages and that although
some authorities "enunciate a doctrine which would exclude
proof by affidavit in regard to the manner in which a verdict was
arrived at without the affiant disclosing his means of information,
this court has adopted a different rule which we think is the cor-
rect one." The presumption is that the affidavit is true, for it
cannot be presumed that a person would made an affidavit charg-
ing that an unlawful verdict has been rendered, and take the
liability for making such an affidavit when the jurors could prove
it to be untrue. The fact that the verdict is for $io,964.56 also
supports the truth of, and is consistent with, the facts stated in the
affidavit.
Wills-Intent of Testator-Advancements.--ammett et a. v.
Hammet etal., 16 S. E. Rep. 293 .(N. C.). The section in question
of the testator's will read as follows: "That when all the assets
of my estate have been sold and converted into money, as herein-
before provided, * * *, and when all of the debts and of the
expenses of the execution of this will and of the administration of
my estate have been paid, then my said executors and executrix
shall distribute the rest and residue of said assets among my chil-
dren as follows: * * ' If it be found that any child has over-
drawn his or her equal share of my estate, then he or she is to
refund the excess to my said executors or executrix." The pay-
ments here referred to were sums of money advanced by the tes-
tator to his different children during his lifetime, and for which
he had taken promissory notes, which, however, were not directed
to be collected in the will. The only ground for the claim that it
was the testator's intention that these payments should be treated
not as advancements (to be kept unconditionally), but as loans,
lay in the last clause of the above quoted section: "That if it be
found that any child has overdrawn his or her share, he or she
shall refund the excess * * * " The whole estate as collected
was insufficient to pay the debts, and therefore there was no
residuum. As, however, this whole section of the will depended
for its effect on the existence of a residuum, it was held to be
mere surplusage, and the same as if stricken from the will. The
clause referred to was therefore held inadmissible to prove the
intention of the testator.
